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The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit 555 ing appeals from the National Labor Relations Board, tax courts, and bankruptcy courts, the total number of administrative appeals filed in the D.C. Circuit during successive eight-year periods grew from 976 in fiscal years 1965 through 1972, to 3824 in fiscal years 1973 through 1980, to 5629 in fiscal years 1981 through 1988.
11
The Federal Circuit represents an even more recent and radical experiment in semi-specialization. The Federal Circuit did not exist until 1982, and as Daniel Meador has emphasized, the circuit was specifically formed to be the first "federal intermediate appellate court whose jurisdiction was in no way defined in territorial terms."
12 The circuit's jurisdiction features a broad but discrete spectrum of appeals and subject matter over which the circuit has exclusive hold. 13 Notably, the Federal Circuit's grip on patent appeals is much more complete than the D.C. Circuit's grip on appeals involving administrative law. Whereas administrative law appeals still routinely reach circuits other than the D.C. Circuit, 14 the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in all cases "arising under" U.S. patent law. 15 Since the Federal Circuit's creation, other circuits' role in the interpretation and application of patent law has been insubstantial. (1992) . 13 See Golden, supra note 2, at 664-66 (describing the Federal Circuit's multiple exclusive jurisdictions).
14 See 2008 REPORT, supra note 2, at 96 tbl.B-3 (listing 11,583 administrative agency appeals as filed in the year ending on September 30, 2008, with 456 such appeals filed in the D.C. Circuit). 15 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (providing the Federal Circuit with "exclusive jurisdiction" over various appeals where "the jurisdiction of [the district] court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338"), with id. § 1338(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . ."). 16 With the benefit of prior work by Craig Nard and John Duffy, see Nard & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1650 n. 107 There are other differences between the D.C. and Federal Circuits. The Federal Circuit's relative youth and lack of a regional raison d'être leave its very existence more open to question. In contrast, even in comparison to other regional circuits, the D.C. Circuit enjoys unmatched prestige. Such prestige results at least in significant part from (1) the D.C. Circuit's role as a "feeder court" for four of the Supreme Court's current nine Justices 17 and (2) the D.C. Circuit's regular handling of high-profile administrative law cases involving questions of broad significance.
18
When the D.C. Circuit addresses questions such as the constitutionality of legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking 19 or the validity of agency rules of facially national scope, such as those setting national air-quality standards, 20 the significance for policymakers and members of the general public is plain. Despite patent law's commonly acknowledged status as an important aspect of economic policy, the general social significance of the Federal Circuit's patent docket can be comparatively difficult to trace because the individual patent cases heard by the circuit tend to focus on highly case-specific issues, such as the scope or validity of one or more particular patent claims. 
II. Patent Law Controversy and Reversals of the Federal Circuit
Over the past quarter century, the Federal Circuit's experience with Supreme Court review has been uneven. In the thirteen Terms from the October 1983 Term through the October 1995 Term, the Supreme Court issued only six patent decisions on the merits. 24 In these decisions, the Court confined its attention to issues generally at the margins of substantive patent law-issues of "procedure, jurisdiction, 
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The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit 559 other four cases were twenty-six to nine against the Federal Circuit, and twenty-one to five in the trio of cases not featuring a classic fiveto-four split on state sovereign immunity.
34
The way in which the Supreme Court speaks in patent cases has also changed. The language of recent Court opinions has struck some commentators as "increasingly disdainful"
35 and "harsh." 36 At the very least, the Court has made clear that its lack of relative expertise is no barrier to its finding what it considers to be gross error in the Federal Circuit's caselaw.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 37 is a case in point. 38 In this 2002 decision, a unanimous Court rejected the en banc circuit's recently adopted approach to determining the scope of a form of estoppel. 39 When the Supreme Court previously addressed the applicability of such estoppel in 1997, it reversed the circuit's judgment but went out of its way to express general confidence in the circuit's "sound judgment in this area of its special expertise."
40 The Court's later opinion in Festo included no such commendatory language and, instead, sternly criticized the en banc circuit for "ignor[ing] the guidance of" the Court's 1997 decision. In recent years, the D.C. Circuit has enjoyed a remarkably high Supreme Court affirmance rate. 46 During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the circuit was regularly the "most frequently reversed" court of appeals. 47 Moreover, the circuit's high absolute number of reversals was not merely a byproduct of a high number of grants of certiorari. 48 The D.C. Circuit's rate of affirmance was markedly low. From Octo- 52 More specifically, during the October 1980 through October 1983 Terms, administrative appeals accounted for over half of the grants that were not summarily disposed of. 53 The D.C. Circuit's affirmance rate in these cases was 9.6%.
54
49 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 712-14 tbl.7-27 (4th ed. 2007) (listing term-by-term data for the regional circuits). Sixteen-year affirmance rates have been derived from Epstein et al.'s data by (1) using the reported term-by-term circuit affirmance rates to calculate, to the nearest tenth of an integer, term-by-term affirmances for each circuit; and (2) dividing the total number of calculated affirmances for the relevant circuit or circuits by the total number of decisions. Fractional affirmance numbers presumably result when Supreme Court decisions include split judgments such as "affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part." McLeese, supra note 48, at 1050 n.8 (describing a convention for assigning fractional affirmance values to split judgments). 50 McLeese, supra note 48, at 1050. 51 Id. In a given year, the number of administrative appeals might be smaller than the number of administrative law cases on appeal because administrative law cases can originate in the district courts, rather than through application or petition to an agency. See, e.g., 1980 REPORT, at A-4 tbl.B-2 ("Administrative Appeals include applications for enforcement or petitions for review of orders of an Administrative Board or Agency.").
53 I algebraically derived a figure of twenty-six administrative appeals out of a total of forty-eight decided cases from McLeese's reporting on (1) the forty-eight "D.C. Circuit certiorari cases decided by the Supreme Court," McLeese, supra note 48, at 1054; (2) the thirty-nine of these cases that were "administrative or United States civil cases," id. at 1061 n.77; (3) the "4.5 affirmances" in these administrative or civil cases, id.; (4) the affirmance rate for granted administrative petitions, id. at 1065; and (5) the affirmance rate for granted United States civil petitions, id. 54 Id. at 1065 (reporting affirmance rates).
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The 59 In NRDC, the D.C. Circuit vacated a Commission rule that had provided a basis for treating the environmental impacts of reprocessing and disposing of nuclear fuel as essentially negligible. 60 In Aeschliman, the D.C. Circuit additionally held (1) that an environmental-impact statement for a nuclear power plant was "defective for failure to examine energy conservation as an alternative" and (2) that an expert report on reactor safety required further explanation. 61 In each case, the D.C. Circuit's opinion was written by Chief Judge Bazelon, 62 64 Nonetheless, the Court overcame this hurdle and concluded that the circuit had held the Commission rule invalid because of inadequate rulemaking procedures. 65 In the Supreme Court's view, this conclusion made NRDC an easy case. There seemed to be no question that Commission procedures had complied with statutory requirements. 66 And the Court had, by its account, already "continually repeated" in an "absolutely clear" way that, "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances," an agency's choice of procedure would stand. 67 The Supreme Court could have concluded discussion of NRDC here. But the Court apparently believed that the D.C. Circuit-or, at least, Chief Judge Bazelon-needed more instruction. The Court described three further, "compelling reasons" to reject the D.C. Circuit's approach to judicial review 68 : • First, the D.C. Circuit's approach would make judicial review "totally unpredictable" and, by encouraging agencies to "adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance," would "totally disrupt [a] statutory scheme" that had provided for informal rulemaking with relatively minimal procedure. 69 • Second, in evaluating agency procedures, the D.C. Circuit had engaged in "Monday morning quarterbacking" by relying on a post hoc record rather than "the information available to the agency" when it chose its rulemaking procedures. 70 
564
The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 78:553 agency procedures could "do nothing but seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress."
72
The Court followed this discussion with a paragraph emphasizing the Court's belief that, in calling for additional procedure, the D.C. Circuit had acted without any legal justification:
In short, nothing in the [Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")], [the National Environmental Policy Act], the circumstances of this case, the nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate [of the agency] permitted the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) . . . . 73 Remarkably, the Court escalated its hyperbole in reversing the D.C. Circuit's additional holdings in Aeschliman. In reversing the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that the Commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on a deficient environmental-impact statement, 74 the Court described the circuit as having "basically misconceive[d] not only the scope of the agency's statutory responsibility, but also the nature of the administrative process, the thrust of the agency's decision, and the type of issues . . . intervenors were trying to raise." 75 The circuit had reasoned contrary to "[c]ommon sense," 76 had "seriously mischaracterized" "the nature of the [agency's] test," 77 and had "forgotten [the Court's prior] injunction" of deference toward agency determinations. 78 In this context, the circuit's finding of arbitrary and capricious conduct "deprive[d] those words of any meaning." 79 But there was worse to come. The Court found it difficult to accept even the actuality of the D.C. Circuit's holding on the Aeschliman expert report. It was "simply inconceivable that a reviewing court should find it necessary or permissible to order" the report returned for elaboration. 80 This was "judicial intervention run riot." 81 72 Id. at 548. 73 Id.
74 Id. at 549-55. 75 Id. at 550. 76 Id. at 551. 77 Id. at 553-54. 78 Id. at 555. 79 Id. at 554. 80 Id. at 557. 81 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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There was "absolutely nothing in the relevant statutes to justify" such an order. 82 The circuit's decision "border[ed] on the Kafkaesque."
83
The sharpness of such language makes Vermont Yankee exceptional. But Vermont Yankee was far from the only administrative law decision in which the Supreme Court expressed frustration with the D.C. Circuit. In 1983, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the circuit's invalidation of the Commission rule that succeeded the one at issue in Vermont Yankee. 84 In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court chided the circuit, saying that, as indicated in the Court's "earlier encounter with these very proceedings, ' [a]dministrative decisions should be set aside . . . only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute . . ., not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached. ' 89 Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court's " 'presumption of unreviewability,' " but agreed that the case was "easy," id. at 840 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment), and that there was no evidence of an abuse of "enforcement discretion," id. at 840-41. 90 Id. at 831. 91 Id. at 837-38. 92 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 279.
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IV. Lessons from the D.C. Circuit's Experience
In reality, the D.C. Circuit remained a leading court of administrative law throughout. Consequently, a first lesson from the D.C. Circuit's experience is that, even in the face of a barrage of Supreme Court reversals far beyond anything that the Federal Circuit has experienced, a semi-specialized circuit can retain a primary role in shaping decisional law in an area of relative expertise. A second lesson is that reversal of a semi-specialized circuit is not an unprecedented phenomenon and might even be a relatively healthy one.
A. Distinguishing Supreme Court Scrutiny and Circuit Performance
Followers of the Supreme Court should not be surprised at the potential for a disjunction between Supreme Court review of a semispecialized circuit and the actual level of circuit influence or performance. A spike in Supreme Court reversals or grants of certiorari does not necessarily indicate that circuit performance is generally poor. Supreme Court Justices are apt to focus critical attention on issues that they perceive as unusually important.
93 Consistent with this observation, Roy McLeese found that, during the Supreme Court's October 1980 through October 1983 Terms, "the three circuit courts that commonly are thought to have the highest concentration of important cases"-the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits-all had above-average grant rates. 94 Moreover, these circuits had "their highest grant rates in the areas of law that most likely contain[ed] their 'important' cases." 95 Whereas the average circuit grant rate was 6.6%, "the grant rate for Second Circuit private civil petitions was 12.5%; the grant rate for Ninth Circuit administrative petitions was 14.6%; and the grant rate for D.C. Circuit administrative petitions was 27.3%."
96
A second point is that overall circuit performance and influence might have relatively little correlation with Supreme Court characterization of circuit error as blatant or baseless. Even within the context of an individual case, Supreme Court rhetoric can be overblown. Overstatement of the strength and certainty of one's own position and 93 See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.11, at 262 (9th ed. 2007) ("The importance of the issues involved in the case . . . is of major significance in determining whether the writ of certiorari will issue."); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 253 (1991) (indicating that importance is a primary factor in certiorari decisions); cf. Duffy, supra note 27, at 284 (asserting that patent law's economic importance "is surely one explanation for the [Supreme] Court's renewed interest"). 94 McLeese, supra note 48, at 1067. 95 Id. 96 Id. (footnotes omitted).
2010]
The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit 567 of the weaknesses of others' is a common malady of legal discoursewhether the medium is a judicial opinion, a brief, an oral argument, or a law review article. 97 In any of these fora, glorification of the logical inevitability of one's own conclusion and condemnation of the absurdity of another's can have polemical and rhetorical value. Perhaps because of this, Supreme Court justices commonly criticize one another, as well as lower-court judges, for putatively gross error. 98 Further evidence of the potentially misleading nature of the rhetoric of reversal comes from Vermont Yankee itself. Commentators have long lamented that Vermont Yankee turned out to be a kind of "paper tiger."
99 After determining that there was no valid procedural ground for invalidating the Commission rule at issue in NRDC, the Vermont Yankee Court acknowledged that the rule might still be defective in substance, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
100
This remand turned out to be a harbinger of the Supreme Court's 1983 adoption of the hard-look doctrine, 101 an aspect of administrative law jurisprudence for which the D.C. Circuit is commonly given primary credit (or blame). 
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The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit 573 the D.C. Circuit remained "straightforward and unrelenting" in championing "environmental values." 124 The history wondered whether Congress would act to force a change of course. 125 As matters turned out, the Supreme Court beat Congress to the punch: Vermont Yankee issued in 1978.
Conclusion and Caution
In sum, the Supreme Court's current critical scrutiny of the Federal Circuit's patent jurisprudence is not unprecedented for a semispecialized circuit. Further, the D.C. Circuit's experience with Supreme Court review suggests that even substantial Supreme Court involvement with substantive patent law does not require that the Federal Circuit lose its role as the principal day-to-day shaper of United States' patent jurisprudence.
A cautionary note regarding the potential staying power of such Supreme Court involvement is nonetheless appropriate. Factors in cessation of the D.C. Circuit's time of high reversal appear to have included: (1) eventual regularization of agency and judicial approaches to informal rulemaking; 126 and (2) mitigation of intercourt differences through turnover in both courts, including the appointment of four D.C. Circuit judges to the Supreme Court.
127 Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Federal Circuit has not established itself as a substantial feeder of judges-or even clerks-to the Supreme Court. Further, although patent law is constantly pressured to adapt to technological and economic developments, it lacks a "Chevron out" for adaptation through agency action because the United States Patent and Trademark Office lacks substantive rulemaking power. 128 Consequently, absent congressional action, pressure for adaptation falls on
